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The Ethics and Politics of Drones in Animal Activism 
Abstract 
This paper considers the use of drones in animal advocacy and aims to provide a moral and political 
justification for their use. We focus on animal protection groups who fly drones over farms to take 
pictures and videos of the way animals are used in agriculture and who then share these images publicly 
with a view to changing either consumer behaviour, the laws which regulate animal agriculture, or both. 
We identify unique moral issues associated with drone use and provide an argument to support their use 
in animal protection, in the ways spearheaded by Will Potter and other animal advocates worldwide. We 
then analyse privacy issues associated with drone use and consider whether the potential harms 
outweigh the benefits. We conclude that while privacy concerns are legitimate, they do not outweigh the 
public good generated by drones. Moreover, animal advocates can easily manage those concerns. Finally, 
we illustrate our argument in practice with a recent case study from Australia. 
This journal article is available in Animal Studies Journal: https://ro.uow.edu.au/asj/vol7/iss1/5 
THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF DRONES IN ANIMAL ACTIVISM 
 
80 
The Ethics and Politics of Drones in Animal Activism 
 
Clare McCausland 
La Trobe University 
Susan Pyke 
University of Melbourne 
Siobhan O’Sullivan 
University of New South Wales 
 
Abstract: This paper considers the use of drones in animal advocacy and aims to provide a moral and 
political justification for their use. We focus on animal protection groups who fly drones over farms to take 
pictures and videos of the way animals are used in agriculture and who then share these images publicly with 
a view to changing either consumer behaviour, the laws which regulate animal agriculture, or both. We 
identify unique moral issues associated with drone use and provide an argument to support their use in 
animal protection, in the ways spearheaded by Will Potter and other animal advocates worldwide. We then 
analyse privacy issues associated with drone use and consider whether the potential harms outweigh the 
benefits. We conclude that while privacy concerns are legitimate, they do not outweigh the public good 
generated by drones. Moreover, animal advocates can easily manage those concerns. Finally, we illustrate 
our argument in practice with a recent case study from Australia.  
Keywords: drones, animals, ethics, politics, activism, technology  
THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF DRONES IN ANIMAL ACTIVISM 
 
81 
1. Introduction 
In 2014, Will Potter, a leading US animal advocate, crowd-funded $30,000 in five days to 
purchase a drone. The drone was used to capture images inside highly inaccessible factory farms. 
Potter has since screened that footage on a nationally broadcast television program in the United 
States called ‘Truth and Power.’ That program forms part of a broader campaign to shed light 
on unseen animal suffering and to challenge the so-called ‘ag-gag’ laws standing in the way of 
greater transparency in animal agriculture – ‘ag-gag’ laws are those intended to restrict or ‘gag’ 
animal activists who capture and disseminate footage of agricultural animal facilities. Potter’s 
online ‘Drone on the Farm’ updates highlight the lawsuits he has fought in the US states of Idaho 
and Utah, in which he challenges these laws as unconstitutional. 
 ‘Drone’ is a broadly used term for an unpiloted aerial vehicle, or UAV. Drones can also 
be referred to as remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) or unpiloted aerial system (UAS). They take a 
variety of forms, ranging from aircraft the size of a helicopter, to bee-sized devices that can 
enter buildings. Drones have been used for some years by the military and are now becoming 
affordable and available for civilian use. Drone use in agriculture is also increasing – both with 
livestock and with crop farming, so it is technology familiar to farmers. Because of their ongoing 
use in the military, much of the available literature concerns the use of drones in the military and 
increasingly for commercial use (see Luppicini and So’s 2016 survey of the literature). 
Worryingly, Luppicini and So note that in this literature, ethics was afforded the least attention 
(113). They point to a ‘risk that continued progress in commercial drone use could be 
jeopardized if innovation stalls because social and ethical concerns are not addressed’ (110). No 
less can be said of moral progress in our treatment of sentient animals. In considering the ethical 
and political dimension of drone use in animal activism, this paper thus contributes to our 
understanding of how choice of technology influences society, and we hope, of how society 
influences the use of new technologies (see Bijker and Law; Rao et al.). 
 Our interest is in animal advocate groups who fly drones over farms to take pictures and 
videos of the way animals are used in agriculture. They do this to gather up-to-date pictures of 
farming practices, including evidence of existing laws being violated as well as evidence of 
routine, legal farming practices that the community might find distressing or problematic (see 
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Brown). Footage used to further the interests of animals is then typically shared publicly with a 
view to changing consumer behaviour; challenging common cultural mindsets that harm 
animals; changing the laws which regulate animal agriculture; providing evidence to the courts 
of ineffective regulation; or all of the above. 
 Animal advocates have recently started using drones in addition to, and in preference 
to, other ways of gathering images. This change has occurred for several reasons. First, the range 
and extent of footage that can be captured by an unpiloted aerial vehicle is unique. Second, 
drones can cover a lot more distance than a person holding a camera. They are harder to detect 
and catch than a group of people on foot inside a farm. Further, in many jurisdictions using a 
drone in some circumstances is not illegal. Their use may therefore pose less legal risk to 
advocates and secures evidence which may be more readily admissible in court because it has not 
been illegally obtained. 
 Not everyone agrees that drones only represent improvement in their ability to gather 
images. Roger Clarke, a consultant and academic specialising in information systems, cautions 
that the ‘single perspective’ and ‘limited context’ of drones are not as effective as humans in 
information capture (290). These concerns are no trivial matter when drones are used to glean 
information about the treatment of animals. The size and shape of the drone in use, together 
with the operator’s willingness to contravene laws about where they might fly, will certainly 
restrict their ability to capture the full picture of what is occurring. For example, a drone which 
can only monitor animals outside will not help us to understand the treatment of animals on the 
same property when they are indoors. The use of drones needs to be part of a more 
comprehensive approach to be helpful. Nevertheless, the new opportunities afforded by drones 
are clearly appreciated by the advocates who are seeking to experiment with them further. 
Given that drones are being used by animal advocates, our aim in this paper is to investigate 
whether the potential benefits they bring are outweighed by the potential harms. 
 For the animal agriculture sector, drone technology represents a serious invasion of 
privacy. This is partly because drones are not as targeted as other ways of capturing information 
and cover far greater distances than is possible in person. They therefore create a much more 
comprehensive digital record, and one which is arguably more open to misinterpretation. And, 
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as Rao, Gopi and Maione note (87), it can be difficult to tell that information has been taken and 
shared. Each of these issues relate to concerns that farmers have with unauthorised photos or 
videos of their operations.  
 Keeping these objections in mind, we will now make an argument that justifies the use 
of drones by animal advocates, in cases where that use is for the purpose of social or legal 
change, by exposing otherwise invisible agricultural practices. In the process we will weigh the 
potential benefits that are likely to be secured against the potential harms that drone use may 
cause, especially those posed by invading the privacy of farmers involved in animal agriculture. 
  
2. Justifying Drone Use  
In brief, we argue that the benefits secured by drone footage outweigh the risks of invading 
privacy because: 
1) Animals are sentient and therefore a legitimate object of moral concern and their 
treatment a legitimate subject of government regulation. 
2) There is evidence that the public is concerned about animal welfare. 
3) This means the public has a legitimate claim to knowledge about how animals are 
treated on farms, in order to make informed contributions to public policy concerning 
how animal agriculture is regulated.  
4) Accurate and comprehensive information about animal welfare on farms is not currently 
available solely through other means, and moreover: 
5) We find a structural lack of transparency in animal welfare on farms, due to the financial 
incentive for farmers to conceal information, as well as the compromised relationship of 
state-sanctioned animal welfare authorities and industry. This means animal advocates 
cannot hope to improve public knowledge of farm animal welfare through other means 
alone. 
We will now argue these points in more detail. 
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2.1 Animals are Morally Significant 
The first important point to note is that animals are a legitimate object of moral concern. There 
are different kinds of arguments we can make here for animal rights, or for taking the interests 
of animals equally into consideration, which have been well documented over the past forty 
years (see Singer; Regan; Pluhar). In addition to the more progressive arguments for moral 
significance made by philosophers, animals are also afforded moral status within mainstream 
anthropocentric moral frameworks (see Garner, ‘The Politics of Animal Rights’ and A Theory of 
Justice; Scruton). The kind of activity we are talking about – using drones to survey farms – is 
directed squarely at improving the lives of animals used in farming. Using drones to do this 
would not be legitimate if those animals did not have interests worth protecting with rights or if 
those interests were so inconsequential that any human interest in private enterprise, or 
preferences for animal protein would necessarily outweigh an animal’s interest in basic welfare. 
This is manifestly not the case. As philosopher Colin McGinn acknowledged in a review of 
Singer’s Animal Liberation, the legitimation of animal interests is essentially a  
‘won argument’ (14). 
 
2.2 Public Concern Justifies Public Knowledge 
Animal welfare is also politically significant. Not only are animals themselves an appropriate 
source of moral concern, the treatment of animals in the agriculture sector has been persistently 
shown to be a source of mainstream concern. Noting the complexity of the word ‘public’ (and 
the ‘sub-publics’ it encompasses), Peter Chen analyses the deeply diverse, volatile and 
behaviourally inconsistent attitudes towards animals held by Australians. Chen concludes that 
despite these complexities and the difficulty of measuring across them, there is an observable 
shift in Australian publics towards increased concern for animal welfare (84). While current 
protections for animals are far from comprehensive, they are widespread and public agitation has 
led to the scale and depth of welfare regulations already in place, however inconsistent they are 
with each other and with practice.  
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 The mainstream acknowledgement of animal sentience (see 2014 Human Research 
Data, cited in Chen, 46) and sustained public concern for the treatment of animals in agriculture 
point to a politically legitimate public interest in the welfare of farmed animals. Open access to 
information about how animals are treated is important, not only to protect the welfare of 
animals per se, but also to reflect the interest that citizens of Australia and other liberal 
democracies have expressed through their efforts to ensure this welfare is regulated (see 
O’Sullivan; Chen). By gesturing towards evidence of flaws, animal advocates can question the 
efficacy of regulations that are in place and thereby help to execute this important work by 
employing drone technologies. 
 Finally, we note that consumers in Australia, and in other comparable jurisdictions 
around the world, are legally entitled to know that what information they have about the 
products they buy is not false, misleading or deceptive. The Australian Consumer Law (ACL), a 
national law for fair trading and consumer protection, ‘allows the Commonwealth Minister to 
prescribe information standards about the information required to be provided by suppliers of 
consumer goods and services’ (Commonwealth of Australia). However, the general protections 
against misleading and deceptive conduct about products offered by consumer protection laws 
are not always straightforward. As Parker, Scrinis and Carey have argued, the labelling of free 
range eggs has created ‘years of consumer confusion’ with stocking ranging from 1,500 birds per 
hectare, to 10,000 per hectare. When consumers purchase a carton of eggs labelled ‘free to 
roam’1 they are entitled to know whether the hens who laid the eggs were free to roam as 
claimed on the box. Currently they may not be sure what being ‘free to roam’ actually means in 
physical terms. Under the ACL, a new information standard has recently been introduced which 
requires eggs labelled as ‘free range’ to have been ‘laid by hens that had meaningful and regular 
access to an outdoor range during daylight hours during the laying cycle; [who] were able to 
roam and forage on the outdoor range; and [who] were subject to a stocking density of 10,000 
hens or less per hectare.’ The stocking density must also be prominently displayed on the 
packaging of any eggs labelled as ‘free range’ (Australian Consumer Law (Free Range Egg Labelling) 
Information Standard 2017). While the newly mandated minimum stocking density is perhaps not 
THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF DRONES IN ANIMAL ACTIVISM 
 
86 
in keeping with the full range of diverse consumer expectations around hen welfare, the impact 
of more detailed information required on egg carton labels is yet to be seen. 
 Animal sentience, public concern and consumer rights provide three compelling reasons 
for increasing public understanding of animal agriculture. This means the public has a legitimate 
interest in – and claim to – knowledge about how animals are treated on farms, in order to 
make informed contributions to public policy concerning how animal agriculture is regulated, as 
well as their own consumption habits.  
 
2.3 There is an Information Deficit 
While animals are morally significant, and people want to regulate and understand their use, 
they would not be able to do this if they relied on the information available through industry and 
government sources. The people who have easy access to agricultural premises have a vested 
interest in concealing the full picture of what takes place on the farm. Contemporary factory 
farms are designed specifically to operate largely automatically, with limited need for human 
labour. That said, builders, vets and transport workers will occasionally have access to these 
facilities. In many cases they have acted as whistle-blowers, reporting evidence of cruelty to 
animal protection organisations. But such access is rare and whistleblowing is an inherently risky 
practice. Farmers have no reason to disclose. They may claim that information is concealed on 
competitive grounds, but there are also shared commercial advantages in not informing the 
public about the unpleasant reality of modern animal husbandry and slaughter. 
 Moreover, the current mechanisms in place for the state to monitor the treatment of 
animals on farms are substantially compromised. The state, which regulates farming, has the 
authority to access farms around Australia, with some limitations on those powers according to 
the particular state or territory. But this role is often outsourced to state departments with a 
possible conflict of interest due to the co-location of animal welfare alongside the agriculture 
portfolio (for a detailed discussion of this see Goodfellow). Alternatively, this responsibility falls 
to under-resourced non-government organisations (NGOs), who rely on donations and 
corporate sponsorship to fund their work. For example, in 2017, the Royal Society for the 
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Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) in New South Wales (NSW) received $1,096,691 in 
government subsidies. The remainder of the organisation’s $7,254,944 income was generated 
via donations, bequests dividends, sales and alike (RSPCA NSW, 12). The ongoing need of such 
NGOs to appeal to both public sentiment and industry sponsors provides a strong disincentive 
for them to obtain and disseminate unflattering footage of controversial or distressing  
farming practices. 
 As noted above, often the only way illegal farming activities are discovered is via parties 
contracting to the business, such as plumbers or transport workers. Yet the limited number of 
people working in these establishments makes whistleblowing less likely. Former chief executive 
officer of the Humane Society of the United States, Wayne Pacelle, authored an historical survey 
of the progress made in animal welfare which shows that animal advocates need to be ‘working 
through multiple channels’ because there is no ‘one simple formula for change, no one strategy 
to drive reform’ (73). This highlights the role played by animal advocates using drones to obtain 
photo and video footage not available by any other means. This role is important to note, 
because if there were less harmful means of providing the public with accurate and objective 
information of farming practices, the need for the morally risky and potentially illegal use of 
drones would be more difficult to justify.  
 We therefore find a structural lack of transparency in animal welfare on farms, due to 
the financial incentive for farmers to conceal information and the compromised relationship of 
state-sanctioned animal welfare authorities and industry, which arguably creates a need for 
animal advocates to use drones in their work. It is much more difficult for animal advocates to 
improve public knowledge of farm animal welfare through other means. 
 An argument can also be made that the democratic interest in making informed 
contributions to public policy justifies illegal behaviour by animal advocates who commit 
trespass in order to advance a morally grounded policy agenda (see McCausland et al.). 
Moreover, strong community responses to exposés such as the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation’s (ABC) reporting of the plight of cattle exported live from Australia to Indonesia 
(see Four Corners 2011) and the recent 60 Minutes report on this issue (2018), attest to the 
community interest in enhanced animal-related knowledge. For the same reason we believe that 
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animal advocates may use drones to obtain and distribute information to the public about animal 
welfare on farms. 
 On these grounds we argue that using drones in animal protection is justified. However, 
the criticisms of drone use must be addressed and weighed against these benefits. So, depending 
on how we understand the nature of moral obligation generally, this argument will only hold if 
the use of drones benefits the greater good, while not violating any rights in the process. We 
will now consider whether these potential harms outweigh the potential benefits of using drones 
for animal protection purposes. 
 
3. Drone Harms  
Farmers whose land is surveilled by drones report both immediate economic (commercial loss) 
and social (reputational or psychological damage) harm. The noise made by drones is unpleasant 
and may affect the tenants of farming property. Significantly, the noise drones make can also 
affect the animals themselves. A spokesperson from the British Country Land and Business 
Association (CLA) noted in 2016 that ‘drones have been flown in close proximity to livestock. 
Animals can be easily frightened by drones, which can cause injury to them and others’ (Sawer). 
His argument builds on concerns raised by a University of Minnesota study, indicating that 
‘bears show a physiological but limited behavioral response to unmanned aerial vehicles’ 
(Ditmer et al.). The farming industry has likewise expressed concern about the lack of control 
over how drone-captured imagery and footage may be presented and interpreted. At Australia’s 
2014 BeefEx lot feeding conference, Trent Thorne, an agribusiness lawyer, suggested farming 
operations could be misrepresented by ‘selective editing and sensational reporting’ (Cawood) – 
a concern, however, which should almost certainly not be limited to images captured by drones. 
However, the most frequently cited concern is the threat drones pose to farmer privacy and 
much of the ostensible damage can be understood in these terms.  
 In cases where animal advocates have used drones, farmers have immediately responded 
strongly on privacy grounds. In newspaper reports they have described the work by animal 
advocates variously as ‘another attack on [farmers’] peace of mind and an invasion of their 
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privacy’ (Cubby): ‘I just say to the general public, would they want this sort of machine 
hovering over their backyard or their house or whatever infringing on their privacy on the 
suspicion that you might be kicking your dog in the back yard’; and ‘I find it extremely 
intrusive, I don't believe these people should have the right to do what they've just done’ 
(Murphy, ‘Animal Liberation Activists’). 
 ‘Privacy’ is a wide-ranging concept. Its scope includes the value of: keeping secrets; 
reproductive autonomy; government surveillance; social media settings; voting without 
government interference; and keeping the colour of one’s underwear to oneself. With very 
significant harms in its purview, the accusation of violating someone’s privacy has a lot of 
traction in public discourse. Indeed, the risk to privacy posed by new technologies was the 
subject of an extensive review by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in 2014. This 
review draws (in part) on the work of legal scholar Daniel Solove, who has argued that ‘Privacy 
seems to be about everything, and therefore it appears to be nothing’ (479). While some 
theorists, such as Ruth Gavison and Adam Moore, argue that control over accessibility – both 
physical and personal – ties privacy rights together, they also note that privacy promotes 
interests as diverse as liberty, autonomy and selfhood, as well as benefitting human relations and 
furthering the existence of a free and democratic society. Another influential account of privacy 
rights made by Judith Jarvis Thomson identifies privacy rights as strictly derivative of other more 
fundamental rights, namely those to bodily security and private property.  
 In an attempt to apply some more rigour to the concept of privacy, Solove (490ff) has 
developed a useful taxonomy of privacy-harming activities and groups them into four  
basic categories: 
1. Information collection: the very act of obtaining information can be harmful in a way 
we describe as a privacy violation. This includes surveillance from afar, and the act of 
interrogating subjects. 
2. Information processing: once information has been collected, there are also risks that 
it will be then handled in a way that causes harm. This may arise from the effects of 
aggregating data; in linking information to specific individuals; in handling information 
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insecurely, risking further dissemination (see below); in the secondary use of data for 
purposes other than what it was collected for; and in excluding individuals from 
knowledge of how their data is shared and used. 
3. Information dissemination: related to the processing of information is how it is – or 
could be – disseminated. Confidentiality can be breached; the disclosure of (true) 
information can affect how others judge an individual; relatedly, information can be 
‘amplified’ or made more accessible in a way that causes harm and in addition to the 
harm of truthful information, further harm can occur with the dissemination of 
distorted, untruthful or misleading information. In addition, the exposure of a person’s 
body or bodily functions (including emotional expression) can cause harm.  
4. Invasion: Solove identifies invasion into personal affairs as a separate category of harm 
caused by privacy violations. In this category he sees intrusion as an act that can ‘disturb 
one’s tranquillity or solitude’ and the wrong of decisional interference, such as undue 
governmental influence on decision making.  
This laundry list of harms that can be understood as privacy violations unsurprisingly has 
numerous overlaps. Indeed, Solove notes that what they have in common may be understood 
well in the Wittgensteinian sense of a ‘family resemblance’ (486). For example, arguably 
intrusion is akin to the potential damage caused by information collection, and dissemination and 
decisional interference are two more ways in which data can be used. Nevertheless, this more 
granular account of what can go wrong brings to the surface the different ways in which privacy 
violations do cause harm, thereby allowing a more nuanced analysis of what may be occurring, 
including the significance of the potential harm caused. This allows us to determine whether the 
harms are outweighed by the benefits. Of the harms described by Solove, we contend that only 
some of these will be inevitable where drones are used on farms, and only a small number of 
other harms will be a possibility. We also support Solove’s notion that none of these ‘violations’ 
is inherently problematic; he cites Anita Allen’s observation that sometimes people ought to be 
held account for their private actions. 
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3.1 Surveillance 
Surveillance, we argue, is an unavoidable effect of drone use. The privacy of farm owners 
therefore will be violated when animal advocates fly drones over farms. When farm owners live 
on that property, and their living quarters are also surveilled, this creates the potential for a 
different kind of harm. To violate personal privacy is much more of a concern to us, than 
capturing footage of farm operations that, as sites of economic production, are obliged to 
comply to business regulations. This is why the harm inflicted by surveillance varies according to 
circumstance.  
 The question of power informs our measure of harm. It is one thing to violate the 
privacy of an agri-business that is potentially operating outside an agreed code of practice, 
particularly when that business claims to be meeting the public expectations inherent to these 
regulations. It is another thing entirely for social justice movements, such as those led by animal 
advocates, to violate the privacy of an individual farmer or a farming family.  
 Navigating such ethical complexities is part and parcel of the contemporary monitorial 
democracy in which we live. Monitorial democracy, as it is understood by Michael Schudson, 
deals with the complicated relationship between the media, other forms of communication, and 
representative power, which is the hallmark of democracy. The issues of objectivity and 
transparency, central to Schudson’s seminal work and to our concerns, are tied up with the 
changing roles of the citizens that make up a democracy (see Schudson’s retrospective review, 
5). Schudson’s monitorial democracy has been elaborated by John Keane, as way of 
understanding the scrutiny of power that takes place through the varied groupings of people that 
influence public policy. As Keane points out, in government circles this process is sometimes 
included in moves towards participatory governance, but monitorial democracy also includes 
public protests, such as those organised by animal advocates. Some citizens are more active than 
others. In Mark Deuze’s analysis of Schudon’s work, where he argues monitorial citizens can be 
understood in terms of their attitude toward public information, he shows how we pay attention 
to the information that matter to us personally. However, as Silvio Waisbord points out, in his 
survey of Schudon’s thinking, ‘The system of monitoring is not a leveled field’ (1233). For 
example, the recorded opinions of a citizen jury can carry more weight than the placards of 
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those participating in a vigil. All the same, even while there is no ideal egalitarian outcome in 
this form of democracy, and powerful interests prevail, as Keane argues, the ‘dynamic’ created 
by this diversity ensures a responsiveness to different opinions (22). Keane makes it very clear 
that these opinionated ‘publics’ are, by their very nature, different from any private or secret 
veillance. We argue that animal advocates’ use of drones indicates that they are actively 
participating in the monitorial democracies in which they live and that the power expressed 
through this participation is variable. 
 The public nature of drone surveillance is different from the more harmful effect of 
continual surveillance and of continually being watched. In addition to making people feel 
extremely uncomfortable, constant surveillance can act as a tool of social control. People are 
inhibited and engage in self-censorship when they know they are being watched, and this 
restricts their liberty. This is often described as the ‘chilling’ effect of surveillance (see for 
example, Clarke 288; Finn and Wright 186).  
 More than that, the awareness of the possibility of surveillance can be just as inhibitory 
as actual surveillance (Moore). The harm of continual surveillance is most famously described in 
Michel Foucault’s reading of Jeremy Bentham’s ‘panopticon’ prison where power, through its 
potential surveillance of all that are subject to change, ‘makes itself everywhere present’ (205). 
This expression of power is particularly relevant for the sporadic use of drones by animal 
advocates. While drone use may be limited, the constant threat of being watched and recorded 
is unnerving and disturbs one’s peace of mind. In this instance we see the related harms of 
information collection and intrusion in Solove’s catalogue of harms. 
 But when we conjure up images of the harmful effects of surveillance as a tool of social 
control, our minds turn to North Korea, the former East Germany, George Orwell’s Big Brother 
and other examples of exaggerated and all-encompassing governmental surveillance. This is a 
key difference because such methods of surveillance represent a significant imbalance in power 
which does not fully apply in the case of animal advocates monitoring the activities of farmers. 
We recognise that the small groups of animal advocates using drones for this purpose represent a 
growing political force, and this may felt as surveillance by individual farmers. However, we 
note that farmers, through their professional activities, are part of a public that has a more 
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significant influence, particularly when it comes to government decision making – we refer here 
to the ongoing bipartisan policy commitments that subsidize and support animal agriculture. 
Finn and Wright in their discussion of the harms of surveillance also point to the question of 
power imbalance. They consider the argument that surveillance technologies used by the state 
‘reinforce existing social positions’ and ‘enable a privileged mobility for some individuals’ (for 
example in airport security systems) – issues which are not in play in the use of surveillance of 
commercial activity by animal advocates. 
 It is precisely in this vein that Clarke, following Steve Mann, uses the term 
‘sousveillance’ from the French ‘sous’ for ‘under’, to describe ‘the use of veillance techniques 
and technologies by the less powerful, usually individuals, against the more powerful, usually 
organisations’ (288). Mann’s term ‘sousveillance’ was developed to describe the emancipatory 
importance of individuals being able to observe the organisational observer (333). Clarke applies 
this term to drone use and argues that drones provide a form of democratisation to those 
without formal power. He further notes that ‘where surveillance is empowered, sousveillance is 
constrained’ (300). While we appreciate that animal justice movements have some informal 
power, it is our view that the animal advocates’ use of drones is a justified form of a democratic 
sousveillance that cannot rightfully be constrained. 
 
3.2 Other Privacy Violations 
The other harms identified by Solove that may be incurred by flying drones over farms include 
identification, disclosure, increased accessibility and intrusion. It is our view that these harms 
can and should be avoided – especially where they entail distinctly personal (as opposed to 
commercial) harm. Likewise, animal activists should seek to avoid harms outside of privacy 
incursions – not least to the animals themselves, as noted above. 
 Importantly, we claim that to achieve the significant benefits that animal advocacy 
certainly brings, it is typically not necessary to publicly identify individual farms or their 
workers, or to widely share even very damaging information about individual farms and people. 
We support the role of activists in bringing about societal change: new and improved laws and a 
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changed consumer mindset that will ultimately bring about the end of the animal agriculture 
industries. But this does not need to be achieved by bringing personal and financial harm to 
workers in the industry one at a time.  
 However, protecting the identity of individuals as well as their psychological tranquillity 
may not be avoidable where farms are small and overlap with personal property and privately 
owned concerns – where information about individuals can be accessed and publicised. Here 
animal protection groups should exercise extreme caution. 
 In addition to personal harms, Richard Posner has argued that privacy benefits society as 
much as it does individuals, and maintains that corporations, too, have privacy rights, the 
violation of which leads to social harm. Posner’s argument for ‘entrepreneurial or productive 
secrecy’ (249) would most likely find support from the farmers and the industry bodies that 
support them. He privileges corporate privacy over private privacy because ‘discreditable facts’ 
are more likely to be concealed (248). This position does not seem to be wholly supported by 
evidence gained by animal advocates to date. It seems to us that the principle of economic 
interests serving a greater social good becomes complicated when put together with the moral 
rights advanced by animal advocates. 
 It is also important to note that drone use by animal advocates must minimise other 
avoidable harms. Drones can crash on top of people, into power lines, interfere with civil 
aviation and cause plenty of other harms if they are not used carefully (Rao et al. 86). 
Minimisation of these risks is essential to legitimise drone use by animal activists, no less than by 
commercial drone operators. 
 One final harm to consider concerns a key question in the philosophy of technology, 
namely the extent to which making use of a new technology shapes the response to this use, 
including its deployment and its social reception. Luppicini and So in their discussion of the 
literature on commercial drone use likewise note that ‘new sources of ethical information and 
knowledge’ can occur when a person and a drone interact to cause new conflicts and violence 
(114). Animal advocacy group PETA employs drones in defence of animals who are hunted, an 
action discussed at length by Kirk. At the end of his account of what happens ‘in the field’ and 
THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF DRONES IN ANIMAL ACTIVISM 
 
95 
the response to PETA’s drone use on YouTube, he describes hunters newly on the lookout for 
the PETA drone and musing about whether to purchase their own – prompting activists to plan 
their response. Kirk writes, ‘In the end, maybe all PETA had done was to give its enemies an 
idea, and a few years down the road, we’ll see a full-blown unmanned aerial war over the sacred 
hunting grounds of America, where the deer and the pheasant are only collateral damage.’ A 
new and aggressive response by farmers to the new technology, and the harm this would entail, 
cannot be ruled out.  
 Yet when we weigh the immediate benefits against these other harms, we find that the 
potential for benefit outweighs the potential for harm. Disseminating images captured by drones 
increases information available to the public and can lead to very positive changes in a particular 
farm’s treatment of many animals. The harms caused by sporadic sousveillance, which may 
result in embarrassment and potential commercial loss; the small risk of unsafe use by activists; 
and the as-yet largely unrealised risk of an escalated conflict between activists and farmers are 
not significant enough to warrant protection by rights, nor to outweigh the benefits both to 
animals and to people as consumers and citizens. After all, the lives of animals living in factory 
farms might be of such poor quality that on balance it would be better that they had never been 
born. If the task here is to weigh harms, then the harm associated with others knowing what you 
are up to and the avoidable risk of unsafe use must outweigh the harm of severe confinement as 
experienced by most agricultural animals. 
 
4. Dora Creek Free Range Eggs: an Australian Case Study 
Australia is home to numerous animal protection groups with various levels of political 
influence, membership, funds and with vastly different approaches to animal protection. As 
such, it hard to know how many groups are currently using, or intend to make use of, drones as 
an animal advocacy tool. One of the most famous cases, which we draw on for analysis in this 
paper, occurred in 2013, when on eight occasions Animal Liberation New South Wales (NSW) 
used a drone to capture aerial footage of one of two properties that produce Dora Creek free-
range eggs. The farms are large, with 65,000 hens. The footage broadcast publicly only captured 
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images of a number of large sheds and their immediate surrounds (Murphy). The footage was 
apparently captured legally in airspace between 10 and 30 metres above the ground.2 Animal 
Liberation’s stated purpose was to determine whether the egg production at the farms was 
genuinely free-range. The question raised was a simple one: did the animals actually have time 
outside the sheds?  
 Animal Liberation NSW claimed that the footage demonstrates that the farmer was 
breaching the voluntary Primary Industry Standing Committee’s Model Code of Practice as no 
birds were let out to roam freely. The code requires free-range hens have access to an outdoor 
range for a minimum of eight hours a day. The farmer denied the claim, saying that he was 
keeping the hens inside as they were being de-wormed (allowable under the code). The story 
was broken by the Landline program on ABC television. The farmer did not cooperate with the 
story or grant access to the shed. Animal Liberation NSW has lodged a formal complaint to the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (Animal Liberation NSW) in relation to 
Dora Creek free-range egg farm. The outcome of that complaint is not yet known.  
 In the case of the Dora Creek free-range egg farm, it would seem that the community 
interest overwhelmingly outweighed any other concerns. There is no evidence that private 
information about the farmer and his family was collected, shared or broadcast and there is no 
evidence that the drone inhibited the farmer and his family’s use of private dwellings adjacent to 
the animals. In addition, there is no evidence of animal welfare concerns that resulted from the 
use of the drones apart from the possibility that the hens were in fact not being dewormed. 
Moreover, there is good reason to believe that animal advocates are not randomly choosing 
farms to survey. Instead, they target their limited resources in cases where a complaint or 
suspicion has been raised.  
 Animal Liberation NSW’s actions seem justified. Information about the hens’ access to 
outdoor space would not have come to light had the drone footage not been available. We argue 
that there is a legitimate public interest in knowing whether free-range birds are spending time 
outside, particularly if consumers are paying a premium for their eggs. While the science of hen 
space use may be contested, establishing the facts of the matter so that consumers can make an 
informed choice would seem to be consistent with the democratic principles outlined here. 
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Animal Liberation NSW appears to have used the material responsibly without risk of individual 
harm, and reported the matter to a suitable authority.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We have argued in this paper that it is legitimate for animal advocates to use drones to achieve 
changes in animal welfare protection laws and to change the cultural mindset with respect to 
using animals. This is because animals are a legitimate source of moral and public concern and 
because information on animal welfare is typically not otherwise accessible. The benefits which 
drone use in activism can bring include a contribution to ending animal suffering and 
exploitation, as well as increased public participation in democratic law making. We also 
addressed the harms that may be incurred by drone use, and focussed on the harm done to 
people’s privacy. We have established that the harms done by violating this privacy are diverse, 
and that while farmer privacy will inevitably be violated, the ostensible harm done by 
surveillance is negligible, given the imbalance in power of advocate to farmer. Other privacy 
harms, including unsettled peace of mind; the risk of unsafe use; and linking individual farmers 
to information are outweighed by both immediate benefits and the potential for a less harmful 
society in the longer term.  
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Notes  
1 ‘Free to roam’ is often used to describe the conditions of broiler chickens raised for their flesh. 
The term is also referenced as a label for egg-laying hens in the explanatory memorandum 
supporting the introduction of the new Information Standard (Australian Consumer Law (Free 
Range Egg Labelling) Information Standard 2017). 
2 It is worth noting that since 2013 the regulatory environment in Australia and elsewhere has 
been changing rapidly, and new restrictions have been developed in recent years on how, 
where, for what purpose and which kind of drones may be used. We cannot say whether the 
Dora Creek campaign would be legal today. If animal activists use drones to carry out illegal 
activities, their legitimacy will also depend on whether they can be justified as acts of civil 
disobedience. 
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